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NOTES
THE PER SE RULE AS APPLIED TO VERTICAL
TERRITORIAL RESTRAINTS: AN
IMPROPER STANDARD
In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.' the United States Su-
preme Court advanced the "ancient rule against restraints on aliena-
tion52 as the basis for its holding that vertical territorial restraints3 con-
THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
Bork, The Rule of Reason and Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division,
75 YALE L.J 375 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Bork].
1. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). See notes 19-31 infra and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of this case.
2. Id. at 380. See generally 2 COKE, INSTrrTS OF Tim LAws op ENGLAND § 360
(16th ed. 1809).
3. A market arrangement is vertical when there exists an agreement, express or im-
plied, between parties on different rungs of the trade ladder regulating the ultimate dis-
tribution of a product to the consumer. Vertical arrangements are to be distinguished
from horizontal arrangements which are formed between competitors on the same trade
level. See generally Bork 375; Note, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365 (1967)-Vertical Customer and Territorial Restrictions and the Sherman Act, 63
Nw. U.L. Rv. 262 (1968).
Territorial restraints involve geographic limitations upon distributors and/or retail-
ers. For example, in Schwinn, distributors could sell bicycles only to retailers located
within the perimeter of the distributor's designated territory. 388 U.S. at 371.
Customer restraints do not involve geographic limitations but do specify to whom
a product may or may not be sold. Vertical customer restraints also appeared in the
Schwinn distribution scheme since the franchised dealers were authorized only to sell
to consumers and not to unfranchised retailers. Id. See generally Note, Restricted
Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARv. L. Rv. 795 (1962).
A third form of market arrangement is price fixing. Because of its obviously harm-
ful anti-competitive nature, all instances of price fixing, vertical or horizontal, direct or
indirect, have been uniformly held to constitute per se violations of the Sherman Act.
See note 4 infra for a discussion of the per se rule. The United States Supreme Court
emphasized that a finding of price fixing mandates application of the per se rule in
United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956): "[P]rice fixing is
contrary to the policy of competition underlying the Sherman Act . . . [and] its illegal-
ity does not depend on a showing of its unreasonableness, since it is conclusively pre-
sumed to be unreasonable. It makes no difference whether the motives of the partici-
pants are good or evil. . .or whether the effect of the agreement is to raise or decrease
prices." Id. at 309-10.
See also United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Dr. Miles Medi-
cal Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (price fixing in a vertical
arrangement); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211
(1951); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing
in a horizontal arrangement).
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stitute per se violations4 of section one of the Sherman Act.' During
the eight years since Schwhin was decided, lower courts have differed
in their interpretations of its holding. Some have embraced the case's
4. Trade practices are subjected to judicial scrutiny under either the per se rule or
the "rule of reason." The development of the per se rule was a logical response to the
adoption of section I of the Sherman Act, which reads in part: "Every contract, combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise . . . in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. . . ." 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1970). The Supreme Court initially applied a literal interpretation of the
statute, and from 1890 to 1911 any activity found to constitute a restraint was con-
demned as illegal per se. See, e.g., Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197
(1904); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
The establishment of per se rules under the Sherman Act is a function of whether
a court has had sufficient experience with a particular trade practice to justify a conclu-
sion that the questioned practice almost invariably lacks any redeeming quality. Other
factors contributing to the decision to adopt a per se rule include the business commun-
ity's desire for certainty in planning its day-to-day transactions and a desire by Congress,
law enforcement agencies, and the courts to avoid the inevitable delays resulting from
prolonged and complex antitrust litigation. See E. KINTNER, AN ANTrrRUST PRIMER 21-
22 (1964); J. VAN CisE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTrrzUST LAws 117 (1970 ed.).
Although the literal interpretation of the statute was abandoned in Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), per se illegality still remains a potent rule which
is applied to several trade practices other than price fixing arrangements discussed in
note 3 supra. See, e.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (horizontal
restraints); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group boy-
cotts); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (re-
ciprocal dealing). See note 31 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of how
some courts have distorted the concept of per se illegality.
The "rule of reason" involves judicial inquiry into the intent and effect of ques-
tioned trade restraints before a restraint's legality is determined. See generally A.
NEALE, THE ANTIrrRusT LAWS OF Wnm UNrrD STATES OF AMERICA 20-21 (2d ed. 1970).
First suggested by Chief Justice White in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S.
1, 63-64 (1911), the rule was more fully developed by Justice Brandeis in Board of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). Brandeis recognized that every trade
agreement restrains to some extent and concluded that the question of legality should
therefore turn on whether a restraint merely regulates competition or actually suppresses
or destroys it. Id. at 238.
Brandeis perceived the proper test of alleged Sherman Act violations to be one of
balancing all relevant factors surrounding the trade restraint. His checklist of factors
to be considered included peculiarities of the business involved, conditions before and
after imposition of the restraint, reasons for the adoption of a particular practice, and
the purpose sought to be attained. Id. Once these factors are considered, he reasoned,
a court will be able to properly interpret the overall effect of the restraint and predict
the consequences of its continuation. Id.
Having established the ground rules for his reasonableness test, Brandeis proceeded
to evaluate the restraint before him by assimilating these relevant factors into a three-
pronged test of nature, scope, and effect. Id. at 239-40. This test, with its ad hoc ex-
amination of all relevant factors surrounding a questioned restraint, is the essence of the
"rule of reason," and courts today essentially follow the Brandeis format when using the
rule.
5. 15 U.SC. § 1 (1970).
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broadest implications, finding the mere existence of a territorial re-
straint sufficient to render a contract of sale per se illegal." Other
courts have understood Schwinn to require the "resolute enforcement"
of a restraint before illegality attaches.7 Still others, confining Schwinn
to its facts, have held that vertical territorial restraints can actually be
justified in certain situations.8
The Supreme Court has not attempted to clarify Schwinn since the
opinion was issued in 1967.1 This Note takes the position that a re-
evaluation is in order. After tracing the case law leading up to
Schwinn, and pointing out the confusion which has ensued since, the
Note will analyze three recent court of appeals cases which demonstrate
the need to replace Schwinn's indiscriminate per se rule with the more
flexible "rule of reason" standard. The analysis will suggest that the
Schwinn rule is unsuitable, first, because its broad "passage of title"
test is particularly susceptible to misapplication, and second, because
the rule discourages the implementation of effective methods of pro-
moting competition, thereby frustrating the policies underlying federal
antitrust legislation.
VERTICAL TERRITORIAL RESTRAINTS BEFORE
AND AFTER Schwinn
The first Supreme Court case involving territorial restrictions in
a vertical arrangement was White Motor Co. v. United States,"0 in
which the Court considered whether to extend the well-established per
se rule prohibiting horizontal territorial restraints'" to agreements be-
6. See notes 32-35 infra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 36-38 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 39-49 infra and accompanying text.
9. The Court may have been presented with an opportunity to reevaluate Schwinn
in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). In Topco, an associ-
ation of small supermarket chains organized in an effort to obtain merchandise under
private labels in order to compete effectively with larger chains. Members agreed not
to sell Topco merchandise outside the territory in which they were licensed to operate,
and there were similar self-imposed restrictions upon sales at the wholesale level.
The Supreme Court held that the territorial restrictions were illegal per se, but this
holding was premised on a finding that the restrictions, while possessing some vertical
characteristics, were essentially horizontal in nature. Id. at 608.
See Note, Territorial Restrictions and the Per Se Rules-A Reevaluation of the
Schwinn and Sealy Doctrines, 70 Mscu. L. REv. 616 (1972), which argued that Topco
provided an opportunity for the Court to adopt a unified doctrine whereby all territorial
restraints would be evaluated under the "rule of reason."
10. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
11. See note 3 supra. The per se rule was first applied to horizontal arrangements in
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), and since then all
forms of horizontal restraint have consistently fallen within the per se rule because they
are "naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition." White
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tween a manufacturer and its authorized dealers. 12 The Court, in
neutral terms, declined to apply a per se rule because it could not gauge
the competitive impact of a vertical restraint on the basis of the evi-
dence before it. 13
Within a year after White Motor was decided, two courts of
appeals had occasion to consider the neutral language appearing in that
opinion. 14  In Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC,5 the Seventh Circuit, in
the process of evaluating a contract of sale under which a manufacturer
limited the territory in which dealers could resell its products, inter-
preted White Motor as explicitly rejecting a per se rule against vertical
arrangements.' 0 The Sixth Circuit reached a similiar conclusion in
Sandura Co. v. FTC.17  In' both cases the challenged territorial
restraints were eventually sustained upon application of the "rule of
reason" test.'
This "rule of reason" test for vertical territorial restraints lasted
only four years before it was supplanted by a rule of per se illegality
in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.'9 Schwinn had been the
leading domestic bicycle producer in 1951, accounting for twenty-two
percent of all sales. Ten years later its market share had fallen to less
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963). See United States v. Topco As-
sociates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (horizontal restraint held per se illegal where no
price fixing involved so long as price exceeds wholesale cost); United States v. Sealy,
Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593
(1951) (horizontal arrangements among competitors to divide territory); Interphoto
Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969) (horizontal restraints part of an
unlawful price fixing scheme).
12. White Motor Company was a manufacturer of trucks. The company entered
into agreements with its distributors whereby the distributor was granted the exclusive
right to sell White trucks within a described territory. The distrbutor in turn agreed
not to sell to individuals or businesses outside the territory. 372 U.S. at 255-56.
13. Id. at 263.
14. Both cases involved alleged violations of section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. The statute reads in part: "Unfair methods of competition in commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." 15
U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1970). The Federal Trade Commission has discretion under sec-
tion 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970), to declare a trade practice unfair if it does violence
to the Sherman Act, and its jurisdiction also encompasses activity which may be deemed
ccunfair" because it is unethical or causes injury to consumers or competitors. However,
this broad jurisdictional base is somewhat offset 'by the Commission's remedial powers,
which generally operate only prospectively and do not assess damages. See generally
P. AREA, AN'rrraus ANrLYsis 62-67 (2d ed. 1974).
15. 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
16. Id. at 831. See note 18 infra.
17. 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
18. Id. at 858; 321 F.2d at 831-33.
19. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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than thirteen percent, while one of its competitors had come to com-
mand twenty-three percent of the market.2 ° In an attempt to bolster
its sagging market position, Schwinn set up a distribution scheme using
some twenty-two wholesalers through which its bicycles were dis-
tributed to franchised retailers. In some cases the goods were sold out-
right, and in others a consignment plan was employed. Under both
arrangements the wholesalers were required to refrain from selling out-
side specific territories assigned by Schwinn, as well as from selling to
retailers that Schwinn had not franchised.21
The Schwinn Court began its discussion of the legality of
Schwinn's practices by acknowledging that the company was not guilty
of price fixing.22  The Court also observed, however, that Schwinn had
not simply been exercising its recognized right to decide to which
dealers it would sell bicycles. 23  Thus, Schwinn's distribution scheme
fell somewhere between trade practices which are illegal per se and
those which constitute permissible vertical restraints. 24
Having thereby established the parameters of its analysis, the
Court proceeded to distinguish territorial and customer restrictions25
which remain in effect after a manufacturer has sold its product from
those imposed upon a product transferred on consignment. This dis-
tinction was drawn in light of the "ancient rule against restraints on
alienation."26 It resulted in the adoption of a strict "passage of title"
test under which post-sale restrictions are declared illegal per se,27
20. Id. at 368-69.
21. Id. at 371.
22. Id. at 373. See notes 3-4 supra.
23. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), which held that a
unilateral refusal to deal with wholesalers and retailers who do not follow suggested re-
sale prices is permissible under the Sherman Act. Earlier cases read Colgate as requir-
ing that some type of illicit contract between manufacturer and dealer must exist before
the termination of a business would be declared illegal. See, e.g., Frey & Son, Inc. v.
Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921); United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252
U.S. 85 (1920). This reading was modified by FrC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257
U.S. 441 (1922), and United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). Parke,
Davis indicated that only manufacturer actions amounting to a mere announcement of
policy and simple refusal to deal would be protected under Colgate. If a manufacturer's
actions go beyond these boundaries, and other methods are used to enforce adherence
to resale prices, a Sherman Act violation will result. Id. at 44. See Comment, The
The Colgate Doctrine: Its Past and Present, 12 HousToN L. Rnv. 409, 415-17 (1975);
Comment, Franchising + Antitrust = Confusion: The Unfortunate Formula, 9 SANTA
CLAI1A LA Y 266, 279 (1969).
24. 388 U.S. at 375-76.
25. See note 3 supra where customer and territorial restrictions are distinguished.
26. 388 U.S. at 380.
27. Id. at 379. The Schivinn Court suggested that "proper application of section 1
of the Sherman Act to this problem requires differentiation between the situation where
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while restrictions in the absence of a sale are to be examined according
to the "rule of reason."2  While holding that vertical territorial
restraints are per se illegal once title has passed, the Schwinn Court
appeared to hedge somewhat by recognizing that circumstances could
arise which would be "relevant to a showing that the challenged
restraint is sheltered by the rule of reason because it is not anticompeti-
tive."29 Thus, the Court apparently felt that post-sale restrictions
might sometimes be justified, and for this reason, it cannot be said that
the Court adopted the same per se standard for vertical territorial
restrictions that is applicable to price fixing. 0 Rather, Schwinn seems
to have established what may be termed a "qualified" per se standard."1
Lower courts have disagreed over the extent of Schwinn's prohibi-
tions. One district court, in United States v. Glaxo Group, Ltd.,3
struck down customer restrictions requiring manufacturer approval
prior to the resale of certain drug products. While acknowledging that
the manufacturer imposed the resale restrictions for the "laudable' pur-
pose of ensuring "uniform standards of health and safety" in drug
preparation, and while admitting that the Schwinn rule was "unpredict-
able," the court nevertheless read Schwinn to require the imposition
of per se illegality." In Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp.,34 the
the manufacturer parts with title, dominion, or risk with respect to the article, and where
he completely retains ownership and risk of loss." Id. at 378-79. To permit the manu-
facturer to control the product's destiny after sale "would sanction franchising and con-
finement of distribution as the ordinary instead of the unusual method which may be
permissible in an appropriate and impelling competitive setting, since most merchandise
is distributed by means of purchase and sale." Id. at 379.
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Harlan, dissented from that part of the opinion
which held post-sale restrictions to be illegal per se. He argued that the ancient doctrine
that a manufacturer has no legitimate interest in what becomes of his products after sale
"no longer holds true in a day of sophisticated marketing policies, mass advertising, and
vertically integrated manufacturer-distributors. Restrictions like those involved in a
franchising program should accordingly be able to claim justification under the ancillary
restraints doctrine." Id. at 392 (footnote omitted).
28. Id. at 381-82.
29. Id. at 374. The Court mentioned the danger of corporate failure and the efforts
of a newcomer who seeks to break into a specific market as situations which might con-
stitute extenuating circumstances. Id. See note 88 infra for a discussion of the "failing
firm" exception in the context of the Sylvania case.
30. See note 3 supra.
31. The Supreme Court has similarly hedged in its application of a per se rule to
another trade restraint, the "tying" arrangement. Compare Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) and International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947) with Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). See
also United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd
per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
32. 302 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1969).
33. Id. at 9.
34. 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.), affd per curiam, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969).
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Second Circuit also indicated that territorial restrictions are per se
illegal under Schwinn, even though this determination was not neces-
sary to the court's holding.3 5 Finally, Schwinn was strictly followed in
a New Jersey case involving the celebrated Glenn Turner pyramid
enterprises. The court in Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.3 6 struck
down a multilevel distribution scheme under which distributors were
limited to a single source of supply and all methods of distribution were
prohibited except by home delivery and at beauty shows. Relying on
federal law,3 7 Kugler declared the scheme illegal per se in light of
Schwinn3
The first case to hold that not all post-sale restraints are invalid
under Schwinn was Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp.,39 where the Third Cir-
cuit focused on the following language in Schwinn:
Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manufac-
turer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an ar-
ticle may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion
over it.40
The court interpreted this passage as sanctioning those vertical restric-
tions for which the manufacturer could supply a rational explanation.41
In Tripoli, a manufacturer terminated sales to a wholesale distri-
butor who had begun selling to retailers hair care products specifically
35. 295 F. Supp. at 720 n.4.
36. 120 N.J. Super. 216, 293 A.2d 682 (1972).
37. Kugler was decided under a state antitrust law which instructed that it be ap-
plied in a manner consistent with the prevailing judicial constructions of analogous fed-
eral statutes. Id. at 238, 293 A.2d at 694.
38. Borrowing terminology from the Schwinn opinion, the court applied a per se rule
because of Koscot's firm and resolute policies which were "grounded upon the communi-
cated danger of termination." Id. at 246, 293 A.2d at 699. Some courts have read
Schwinn as sanctioning vertical restrictions where a resolute enforcement policy and a
communicated danger of termination are absent; to this extent, these requirements may
be seen as a qualification of Schwinn's sweeping per se rule. See Colorado Pump & Sup-
ply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973);
Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 938 (1968); Comment, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions Under the
Sherman Act: Decisions Since United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 22 J. PuB. L.
483, 489-90 (1973); cf. United States v. Eaton Yale & Towne, Inc., 1972 Trade Cas.
f 73,899 (D. Conn. 1972).
39. 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
40. Id. at 936, citing United States v. Arnold, Schwinu & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379
(1967).
41. This interpretation of Schwinn'ms "without more" terminology received recent
support in Good Investment Promotions, Inc. v. Coming Glass Works, 493 F.2d 891
(6th Cir. 1974). But see Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 120 NJ. Super. 215, 245-
46, 293 A.2d 682, 698 (1972) (Tripoli's reading of "without more" criticized as "nar-
row").
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earmarked for professional use only. Because of the potential dangers
to health which general consumer use presented,42 the Third Circuit
concluded that protecting the public from injury and insulating the
manufacturer from potential product liability together offset any reduc-
tion of competition which might have resulted from the sales restric-
tions.43
The "dangerous product" exception established by Tripoli was ex-
panded to accommodate product peculiarities in LaFortune v. Ebie.44
In that case a fast-food franchisee had delivered chicken to homes out-
side his assigned territory. Taking the position that Schwinn had not
proscribed all territorial restrictions, a California appellate court re-
versed a trial court determination of per se illegality, holding that the
restraint in question was susceptible to ratification under the "rule of
reason" standard. 45  The court remanded the case for a new trial and
provided a checklist of factors to be considered by the lower court in
deciding whether the restraint was justified: "For example, speed of
delivery, quality of product, and condition of product at time of delivery
may be factors which under the rule of reason could justify restraints
of trade that would be unreasonable in the marketing of a standardized
manufactured appliance." 46
Also upheld as a proper exception to Schwinn have been "area
of primary responsibility" clauses, under which a franchisee is required
to concentrate his efforts in a designated territory but is allowed to sell
outside that territory.4T These clauses are unattractive for at least two
42. Some of the bottles and individual instruction sheets designated for professional
use did not meet the labeling requirements of the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act.
The danger created by these factors was compounded by the fact that the items desig-
nated for professional use were not identical to those sold for consumer use. 425 F.2d
at 937 (3d Cir. 1970).
43. A "dangerous product" exception to Schwinn was recognized by a district court
in United States v. Safety First Products Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. 1 74,223 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), where a manufacturer prohibited the resale of fire extinguishing equipment to
those not trained in the installation and servicing of the equipment.
44. 26 Cal. App. 3d 72, 102 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1972).
45. Id. at 75, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
46. Id. at 75-76, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 590. But cf. Clairol, Inc. v. Cosmetics Plus, No.
C-241-72 (Sup. Ct. N.J., July 26, 1974) (Schwinn's broad policy that manufacturers may
not restrict the transfer of their product after sale may not be frustrated by manufac-
turer's motive to protect its goodwill established through years of advertising and serv-
ice).
LaFortune's restriction of Schwinn, which may be termed the "unique product" ex-
ception, was unsuccessfully pursued by Adolph Coors Company in cases discussed later
in this Note. See notes 50-75 infra and accompanying text.
47. Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973); Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Associates, Inc., 353 F.
Supp. 1143 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Plastic Packaging Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co.,
[Vol. 1975:935
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reasons, however. First, they tend to frustrate the minimization of
post-sale service costs which only a rigid market division, through
elimination of resale competition, can accomplish. 4 Second, a manu-
facturer who utilizes such a clause runs the risk of having it declared
a mere facade designed to shield an illegal territorial restraint, with the
result that the manufacturer's elaborate arrangement will fall victim to
the per se rule.49
THE Coors CASES: A TEMPTATION RESISTED
The Adolph Coors Company brews, distributes and sells beer
under the trade name of "Coors." From a single brewery in Colorado,
the company distributes its beer to just eleven states. Distributors are
assigned a specific territory in which they may market the beer, and
its standard distribution contract enables Coors to terminate the con-
tract for any breach of the territorial restrictions which it imposes. 5°
In Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC,51 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
327 F. Supp. 213 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Contra, Hobart Bros. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc.,
471 F.2d 894 (5th -Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973). See note 49 infra.
One commentator has argued that SchWinn never did proscribe the use of this de-
vice. See Zimmerman, Distribution Restrictions After Scaly and Schwinn, 12 ANN-
TRUST BULL. 1181 (1968).
48. See Bork 467.
49. This was the rationale behind the holding in Hobart Bros. v. Malcolm T. Gilli-
land, Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1973), where a "primary responsibility" clause was
found per se illegal because it was the result of "a silent understanding to restrain
trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. . . ." Id. at 900.
50. Coors, the nation's fourth largest brewer of beer, has adopted business practices
unique to the beer industry in that its three larger competitors have established "branch
breweries" throughout the United States. The company maintains its single brewery in
Golden, Colorado, because Coors beer is made only with nearby Rocky Mountain spring
water, which is generally free of organic materials. Use of this water allows the beer
to be made by a non-pasteurized, aseptic process which accounts for the beer's light taste
and high price.
Because the aseptic process is used, Coors beer is very fragile, and the company
claims that if the beer is not kept continuously refrigerated or is maintained over ninety
days, it spoils. The company's brewing process and distribution procedures are discussed
in detail in Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 936-37 (5th Cir.
1975), and Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. de.
ied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1975).
The credibility of Coors' claim that the need for continuous refrigeration justifies
imposition of territorial restraints was recently challenged when a federal district judge
dismissed Coors' complaint against a beer distributor who was purchasing Coors beer
in Colorado and shipping it to North Carolina for sale to retail outlets. The court stated
that despite the transfer of the beer to North Carolina in an unrefrigerated truck, Coors'
reputation had not been damaged because not all of its authorized distributors' delivery
trucks are refrigerated, and not all retail outlets served by" the distributors have proper
refrigeration facilities. Wall Street J., Feb. 28, 1975, at 12, col. 2.
51. 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974).
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Circuit upheld an FTC finding that Coors was in violation of section
five of the Federal Trade Commission Act.2  The court first ruled that
there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding of
per se illegality because of Coors' price-fixing and price-maintenance
programs.5 This initial holding made any further analysis of the Coors
distribution scheme unnecessary, 54 yet the court went on to examine
Coors' claim that its territorial restrictions were reasonable and legal 55
Considering itself compelled in light of Schwinn to strike down the re-
strictions as illegal per se, 56 the court nevertheless urged that the
Schwinn rule be modified: "Perhaps the Supreme Court may see the
wisdom of grafting an exception to the per se rule when a product is
52. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). See note 14 supra.
In an Initial Decision, the Administrative Law Judge found that Coors had not vio-
lated the Act and recommended dismissal of all charges. On appeal, the Federal Trade
Commission substituted its findings for those of the Administrative Law Judge and or-
dered Coors to cease and desist from, inter alia, entering into price fixing agreements,
threatening termination of distributorships upon a refusal to sell at recommended prices
or a violation of territorial restrictions, and entering into or enforcing agreements to re-
strict territories in which a distributor may sell. Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d
at 1181 n.2 (10th Cir. 1974).
53. 497 F.2d at 1184. Among the charges leading to the finding of illegal price
maintenance programs were refusals to sell to retailers unless they adhered to Coors'
suggested prices and failure to deliver beer to retailers who cut prices. Id. at 1185. One
retailer who testified that his distributor had cut off deliveries after the retailer had of-
fered special weekend prices subsequently brought a private action against Coors in
Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975). See notes
58-70 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
54. As indicated in note 3 supra, the courts have consistently held that any finding
of price fixing necessitates a finding of per se illegality.
55. Coors argued that freshness and proper handling under refrigeration depended
upon the use of territorial restrictions. The substance of these arguments was detailed
more fully in the Copper Liquor case, where Coors argued that distributors, who must
make large capital expenditures to meet the refrigeration standards necessary for ware-
houses and trucks, would have difficulty in obtaining necessary credit and shy away from
making such expenditures absent an assurance that another Coors distributor within a
territory would not compete with them. Furthermore, Coors feared that the presence
of intrabrand competition would tend to erode the company's market penetration,
whereas increased market penetration was essential to Coors' growth because their cen-
tralized brewing facilities tended to make impractical any expansion of the geographical
area serviced. Coors also cited the difficulties in monitoring proper treatment of the
beer, assuring proper maintenance of draught facilities, and supervising compliance with
state alcoholic beverage statutes as justifications for its territorial restrictions. 506 F.2d
at 937-39.
56. The Tenth Circuit read Schwinn as a "clear and unequivocal" adoption of a
"passage of title" test. Accordingly, it held that since Coors had parted with title and
risk to its beer upon sale to distributors, any effort thereafter to restrict territories or
persons to whom the 'beer could be transferred was a per se violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act or section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 497 F.2d at 1186-
87.
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unique and where the manufacturer can justify its territorial restraints
under the rule of reason."'5 7
In Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co.,58 a retail liquor store
owner charged that Coors had conspired with its distributors, in viola-
tion of section one of the Sherman Act, 59 to fix the resale price of its
beer, and that it had directed its distributors to cut off the store owner's
supply when he sold the beer below a suggested price. 60 The store
owner also charged that Coors had conspired with its distributors to
create and enforce exclusive territories within which a distributor was
permitted to conduct business, thereby preventing the owner from ob-
taining more beer from other distributors once his original supply was
cut off. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that there
was sufficient evidence of price fixing in the record to show a Sherman
57. Id. at 1187 (emphasis added). The court prefaced its plea with a reference to
LaFortune v. Ebie, 26 Cal. App. 3d 72, 102 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1972), which supported
the theory of excepting "unique products" from the per se rule (see notes 44-46 supra
and accompanying text), but tied to the LaFortune exception an additional requirement
that the restrictions be necessary to remain in business. 497 F.2d at 1187. When
couched in these terms, the exception to the per se rule described by the Coors court
resembled the "failing firm" exception Schwinn itself appeared to recognize. See note
29 supra.
The probable explanation for Coors' failure to avail itself of the "failing firm" ex-
ception suggested in these cases is that this defense is usually limited to situations where
a company is in danger of bankruptcy. See, e.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United
States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969). Coors, the fourth largest beer brewer in the United States,
was in no danger of collapse. Nevertheless, Coors argued in its petition for certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court that "[d]estruction of the Coors vertically-assigned
exclusive marketing territories will . . . threaten the very market penetration which is
required for Coors to survive in the industry . . . ." 681 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. at A-15 (Sept. 24, 1974), quoting Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, No. 74-128, Petition
for Certiorari, Aug. 16, 1974 (emphasis added). The wording of this petition suggests
that Coors may have recognized the propriety of the "failing firm defense" in situations
other than imminent corporate collapse. See note 88 infra where this interpretation of
the "failing firm defense" is discussed more fully.
The Tenth Circuit may have precluded a Supreme Court reconsideration of Schwinn
-as it had requested-by agreeing with the Commission's finding of price fixing. Ap-
parently realizing the futility of an appeal based solely on the argument that a "rule
of reason" should be adopted where price fixing is present, Coors' petition for certiorari
attacked the Tenth Circuit's evaluation of the price fixing evidence. Coors claimed that
the court had considered only that evidence supporting the FTC's decision and argued
that such an interpretation of the standards for judicial review of administrative pro-
ceedings was violative of due process. 681 ANrusT & TRADE REG. REP. at A-16
(Sept. 24, 1974).
58. 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
60. The plaintiff retailer in Copper Liquor had previously testified about Coors' al-
leged price fixing in Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC. See 497 F.2d at 1185; 506 F.2d at
936. See note 53 supra.
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Act violation.01
Recognizing the reasonableness of Coors' territorial restrictions in
light of its unique brewing process, 62 the Fifth Circuit, like the Tenth
Circuit,0 3 was tempted to graft an exception to Schwinn.6 4  Indeed, the
Fifth Circuit professed agreement with Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp.6 5
which had urged that Schwinn should not apply where products require
close supervision.Y0 But the court refused to apply the Tripoli excep-
tion because the Coors restrictions, while yielding a secondary benefit
by maintaining quality control, 67 functioned primarily as devices for
controlling prices.0 Thus, the taint of price fixing' foreclosed
ratification of Coors' distribution practices under the "rule of reason. '70
Although the presence of price fixing in the Coors distribution
scheme compelled a finding of per se illegality, the Coors cases unmis-
takably encourage a change in the sweeping per se rule announced in
Schwinn. The Tenth Circuit urged the Supreme Court to modify the
Schwinn rule for cases involving a unique product,71 and the Fifth Cir-
cuit suggested that, in addition to the "failing firm" and "newcomer"
61. 506 F.2d at 946. The case was remanded to the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas to determine the extent of injury and damages, if any,
which were sustained by the plaintiff. Id. at 955.
62. See note 50 supra.
63. See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
64. Id. at 944.
65. 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
66. See notes 39-43 supra and accompanying text.
67. Quality control considerations were advanced to justify enforcement of terri-
torial restrictions in Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 375 F. Supp.
610, 622-23, modified, 383 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1974). However, the court in Tod-
hunter found this argument unconvincing because examination of the evidence offered
at trial revealed that the defendant's concern over quality control was insignificant.
68. 506 F.2d at 944.
69. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
70. he court went on to state in dicta that even if price fixing were absent from
the facts of the case, the record would not support a conclusion that the territorial re-
strictions were essential to the survival of the firm: "It may be that the process by
which Coors beer is brewed necessitates refrigerated marketing and rotation of stock,
and that vertical territorial restraints are helpful in supervising the proper application
of these techniques. . . . But there is not enough in the present record to demonstrate
that these ends could not be met by less restrictive means than those presently em-
ployed." Id. at 944-45 (footnote omitted).
While the validity of the assertion that a trade restriction is always improper if a
less restrictive alternative is available might be questioned, the fact remains that such an
analysis simply represents an application of the "rule of reason." Use of the "rule of
reason" does not guarantee that a trade practice will be upheld; rather, its value lies in
the prevention of a premature judgment rendering illegal per se a practice which may
be justified when all alternatives are weighed. See note 4 supra.
71. Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178, 1187 (10th Cir. 1974).
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situations recognized by the Schwinn Court itself,72 other exceptions to
the rule may be appropriate. 73 By taking pains to urge some modifica-
tion of Schwinn after having established the clear illegality of Coors'
distribution practices, the two Coors courts appeared to support the
arguments originally advanced in Tripoli74 and LaFortune75 favoring
the adoption of the "rule of reason" for evaluating vertical territorial
restraints.
Sylvania: THE DANGERS OF CONTINUED
ADHERENCE TO Schwinn
A recent case from the Ninth Circuit, GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Con-
tinental T.V., Inc.,7" illustrates how continued attempts to adhere to
Schwinn can result in a misapplication of its per se rule. The case also
affords a further opportunity to analyze the potentially adverse effects
that applying a per se rule to vertical territorial restraints will have on
competition. In 1962, Sylvania adopted a new franchising policy
designed to strengthen its declining position in the television market.77
Under this "elbow room policy," the number of retail franchises in a
given geographic area was limited in order to reduce competition
among authorized franchisees; however, franchised retailers were per-
mitted to sell televisions to customers who lived outside the assigned
areas.78
In the fall of 1965, Continental, a retail chain operating Sylvania
franchises at eight locations in northern California,79 opened an unau-
thorized store in Sacramento. Continental stocked its new Sacramento
store by transferring Sylvania sets from one of its franchised locations.
After a month of unsuccessful efforts to halt this practice, Sylvania can-
celled Continental's franchise. 0  Continental then brought an action
72. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
73. Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 945 (5th Cir. 1975).
74. See notes 39-43 supra and accompanying text.
75. See notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text.
76. 1974-1 Trade Cas. 75,072, at 96,792 (9th Cir.), petition for rehearing en banc
granted, Civil No. 71-1705 (Dec. 12, 1974).
77. Sylvania's share of the television market was approximately two percent in 1962.
Within two years after adoption of this new "elbow room policy," its market share rose
to five percent. 1974-1 Trade Cas. at 96,793.
78. Id. This "exclusive location" agreement, while involving no specific geographi-
cal boundaries, is nevertheless a form of vertical territorial division since the built-in
impracticalities of doing business at a distance restrict the area in which the majority
of a franchisee's business is conducted. See Bork 466.
79. 1974-1 Trade Cas. at 96,796 (dissenting opinion).
80. Id. at 96,793.
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charging that Sylvania had violated section one of the Sherman Act8l
by enforcing the location clause of the franchise contract. It prevailed
at the trial level, winning an award for treble damages.82
The Ninth Circuit sustained the award, confirming that the source
of Sylvania's liability was its series of attempts to enforce the location
restrictions.83 These "attempts to enforce" were classified as per se
illegal under Schwinn's "passage of title" test because they were made
after Sylvania had sold its televisions to Continental. 4
Even assuming the continued vitality of Schwinn's broad per se
rule, Sylvania did not present an appropriate occasion for its applica-
tion. The Ninth Circuit failed to recognize the distinction between the
transfer of a franchised product within a single company and an ordi-
nary dealer-customer sale. This distinction is important, for although
a manufacturer is relatively uninterested in who ultimately purchases
his product, he usually does have a strong interest in who sells it.8 5
When Continental shipped Sylvania television sets to an unauthorized
store in Sacramento, the effect of the transfers was to establish a new
Sylvania outlet;s6 and the court, by sanctioning these transfers, gave
Continental the power to determine the location and number of auth-
orized Sylvania dealerships. This right clearly belonged to Sylvania
alone.87 Thus, as a result of improperly applying Schwinn's "passage
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
82. 1974-1 Trade Cas. at 96,797 n.7 (dissenting opinion).
83. Id. at 96,795.
84. Id.
85. For example, a manufacturer obviously prefers to have his product sold by deal-
ers possessing service expertise and promotional abilities. See notes 114-115 infra and
accompanying text.
86. The court acknowledged that Sylvania could have used legal means to prevent
Continental from holding itself out as a franchised dealer at unauthorized locations, id.
at 96,794, but conceded that its holding in the case did not spell out what those legal
means were, id. at 96,795. Yet by embracing the "passage of title" doctrine of Schwinn,
the court appeared to adopt an inconsistent position, since Schwinn prevents any en-
forcement of restrictions after title has passed.
87. The unquestioned right of a manufacturer to determine who his franchisees will
be, and where they will be located, was recognized by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 376 (1967). The Sylvania court itself
recognized this right, 1974-1 Trade Cas. at 96,794, but found the source of liability to
be Sylvania's "procuring an agreement" of location restriction and its subsequent at-
tempts to enforce that agreement, id. at 96,795.
There seems to be no support for the argument that an exclusive location agreement
is itself illegal. In United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), the
Supreme Court expressly declined to declare a location clause illegal, id. at 139-40, and
in Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822, 823 (2d Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943), the Second Circuit held that a contract clause restricting
used car dealer locations was not an unreasonable trade restraint.
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of title" test, the Ninth Circuit created an unworkable rule whereby
a franchisor is given the exclusive right to determine the location of
its franchised outlets, but is prevented from taking steps to enforce this
right.88
In addition to illustrating that Schwinn is susceptible to misapplica-
Since the location clause itself was insufficient to justify a finding of illegality, Syl-
vania's attempts to enforce the agreement must have been the source of its liability. As
indicated in note 23 supra, the Colgate doctrine is limited -by Parke, Davis and Beech-
Nut to a simple refusal to deal and does not exempt enforcement activities beyond this
point. However, this reading of Colgate may well be inapposite with respect to the facts
in Sylvania, since Parke, Davis and Beech-Nut involved the enforcement of suggested
retail prices, a considerably more suspect trade restraint than an exclusive location
clause. See note 3 supra.
In a further attempt to justify its application of Schvinn to the facts in Sylvania,
the majority suggested that if Continental had formed a wholly owned subsidiary to op-
erate the unauthorized store to which it then sold Sylvania sets, it would have been much
more difficult to draw the franchise distinction urged by Sylvania. 1974-1 Trade Cas.
at 96,795 n.2. The transparency of this argument is revealed when one considers its
treatment from an accounting perspective. When selling a product to its wholly owned
subsidiary, the parent records the transaction as intercompany income, while the subsid-
iary records an intercompany expense. At the fiscal year-end, consolidation of the two
companies' financial statements results in a wash of the intercompany transaction, elimi-
nating it from the consolidated income statement. For an illustration of how intercom-
pany expenses are treated in a consolidated income statement, see H. FnNnY & R. OLD-
BERG, LAWYER'S GuiE TO ACCOUNTING 269-73 (1955).
88. See 49 N.Y.U.L. Pv. 957, 968 (1974). The Ninth Circuit may have also erred
in its application of Schwinn by refusing to accept Sylvania's argument that its territorial
restraints should 'be tested by the "rule of reason" because it was a "failing firm." The
company argued that at the time its "elbow room policy" was instituted, termination of
its television manufacturing division would have been unavoidable unless its market
share were increased. While Schwinn recognized that the danger of market failure is
a possible justification for invoking the "rule of reason," 388 U.S. at 374, the Sylvania
majority rejected Sylvania's argument because the company's market share had increased
substantially by the time Continental's franchise had been terminated, and Sylvania had
made no claim that it was about to abandon the television market in 1965. 1974-1
Trade Cas. at 96,796.
In his dissent, Judge Ely argued that the majority's interpretation of the "failing
firm" defense was unworkable in the context of an ongoing method of distribution be-
cause a company would need to remain in a failing market position as long as a vertical
restraint was in effect in order to qualify for the defense. Id. at 96,802. He offered
a different reading of the defense, suggesting that a company would need to establish
initially that it was in danger of market failure, after which it could justify continuing
a restraint by showing that market failure would still occur without it. Id. Such a test
appears to be somewhat impractical in light of the need for continuing judicial supervi-
sion as long as a particular remedial measure is used. Nevertheless, Judge Ely's test
appears preferable to that of the Sylvania majority since, under the majority's reading,
companies desiring to strengthen their weak market position can implement only those
ineffectual policies which keep their market position at the same level which originally
signaled the need for a change.
For an excellent discussion of the judicial development of the "failing firm" defense,
see Blum, The Failing Company Doctrine, 16 B.C. INm. & COM. L. Rnv. 75 (1974).
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tion, Sylvania also demonstrates that applying an indiscriminate per se
rule to vertical territorial restraints is improper because such a rule 1)
does not recognize possible policy justifications for restraining intra-
brand competition, 2) limits a manufacturer to unattractive marketing
alternatives, and 3) unreasonably frustrates the adoption of valid
franchising arrangements.
Sylvania's objective in adopting its "elbow room policy" was to en-
hance its market position89 and, by making its product more competi-
tive, to promote interbrand competition. By limiting franchise density,
a procedure resulting in the reduction of intrabrand competition,90 the
company hoped to provide its retailers with the incentive to carry and
to promote the Sylvania brand. However, intrabrand competition was
reduced only to the extent that franchisees were restricted to selling
at locations selected by Sylvania.9 The propriety of these restrictions,
when imposed as a means of promoting interbrand competition, has
been the subject of spirited debate.9 2 Those commentators advocating
the use of vertical territorial restraints argue that any reduction of intra-
brand competition is offset by the increased operational efficiency
which each dealer achieves as a result of being forced to develop his
territory fully. 8 Greater efficiency in turn assures higher profit mar-
gins, which arguably serve to create dealer goodwill.94 Furthermore,
89. See note 77 supra.
90. See generally 53 TE A L. REv. 127, 131-32 (1974).
91. 1974-1 Trade Cas. at 96,794. That this restriction was unimportant in light of
Sylvania's ultimate purpose was stressed by Judge Ely in his dissent:
In ignoring Sylvania's ultimate purpose, to remain in the market as a competi-
tor, and looking solely to its immediate purpose, to limit intrabrand competi-
tion, the majority misses the forest while viewing the trees. The free market
policy of the antitrust laws is not served by fashioning rules which foster in-
trabrand competition to the point of extinguishing interbrand competition. In
a market dominated by a single company, RCA, it is relevant that Sylvania
possessed only a minor fraction of the market, that dealers possessed no veto
power against additional dealers entry into the area, that dealers could and did
carry competing brands, and that the limitation of location on Sylvania dealers
had no effect on prices, volume of products available, quality, or consumer
choice. Id. at 96,800 n.18.
92. Compare Bork 430-52, with Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Re-
strictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HAv. L. REV. 1419, 1422-33 (1968).
See Day, Exclusive Territorial Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws-A Reappraisal,
40 N.C.L. REv. 223 (1962); Jones, Control of Distributors' Activitie, 1964 A.B.A. AN-
Trrrusr SECTION 68; Jordan, Exclusive and Restricted Sales Areas Under the Antitrust
Laws, 9 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 111 (1962); Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements:
Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 LAW & CoNTrar. PROB. 506
(1965); Stewart, Antitrust Considerations Involved in Product Distribution, 19 Bus.
LAWYER 967 (1964); Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act,
75 HAv. L. REV. 795 (1962).
93. See Bork 438-39. See also P. AisEDA, supra note 14, at 539-40.
94. See P. ARBEDA, supra note 14, at 539.
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the assurance of a specific market insulated from competition by other
dealers selling the same brand may provide the necessary incentive for
a potential dealer to carry an untried product, or to make initial capital
expenditures which might otherwise be considered too speculative. 5
Commentators opposing vertical territorial restraints note that a per se
rule has been applied to horizontal arrangements96 providing similar
efficiencies and risk reductions." It has also been urged that vertical
restrictions allow distributors to engage in unjustified product differen-
tiation which, by reducing product interchangeability and interbrand
price competition, allows a manufacturer to increase prices and restrict
output, all at the consumer's expense.9 Regardless of the relative
merits of these arguments, the very existence of the debate suggests
that vertical territorial restraints are too diverse and complex to be
governed by a broad and indiscriminate per se rule.99
Sandura Co. v. FTC,100 decided three years before Schwinn, pro-
vides a model for analyzing the effect of a vertical territorial restraint
on intrabrand competition under the "rule of reason." In Sandura, a
manufacturer of hard-floor covering granted closed territories to its dis-
tributors, who also handled much of Sandura's advertising program.
The Sixth Circuit recognized that product differentiation,101 a "hall-
mark" of the floor-covering industry, increases the importance of intra-
brand competition and that consequently, where product differentiation
is extensive, there must be strong reasons for restricting intrabrand
competition.'0 2 The court then proceeded to assess the importance of
successful advertising in an industry characterized by highly differen-
tiated products. Finding that the advertising services provided by its
distributors were essential to Sandura's ability to continue as a competi-
tive force in an industry dominated by larger firms, the court upheld
the closed territories. 0 3
In addition to proscribing potentially effective methods of pro-
moting interbrand competition, continued adherence to Schwinn may
encourage some manufacturers to acquire outright ownership of distri-
95. See generally 88 HARv. L. RPv. 636, 640-41 (1975). This argument was ad-
vanced by Adolph Coors Company in the Copper Liquor case. See note 55 supra.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
97. See Comanor, supra note 92, at 1429.
98. Id. at 1422-27.
99. See Note, supra note 9, at 636-37.
100. 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964). See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.
101. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
102. Id. at 857.
103. Id.
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bution mechanisms by way of vertical integration.10 4 The integration
of manufacturing and distribution functions would obviate the enforce-
ment problems which franchising agreements entail, but the cost of
vertical integration is so high'0 that, as a practical matter, it is an alter-
native available only to larger companies with substantial available
capital. Moreover, by enlarging their already extensive operations,
companies which resort to vertical integration would arguably be acting
in a manner inconsistent with the policies underlying the federal anti-
trust statutes. 100
Other marketing alternatives available to a franchising manufac-
turer include the utilization of a consignment plan, 0 7 and the complete
severance of all controls over a product after it has been sold to a distri-
butor. Exclusive reliance upon a consignment plan would be unattrac-
tive to most manufacturers due to the administrative burdens which it
imposes and the added expense required in maintaining larger inven-
tories. 08 Like vertical integration, consignment plans appear to repre-
sent a viable alternative only for companies with readily available
capital.' Finally, completely severing all controls over a manufac-
104. See Pollack, Alternative Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63 Nw. U.L. REV.
595, 608-10 (1968); Comment, Franchising, supra note 23, at 281.
Schwinn itself developed and implemented a plan of vertical integration after losing
the Continental lawsuit. See Keck, Alternative Distribution Techniques-Franchising,
Consignmnent, Agency, and Licensing, 13 ANTrTRusT BuLL. 177, 188-90 (1968).
105. See Comment, Franchising, supra note 23, at 281.
106. See section 2 of the Sherman Act: "Every person who shall monopolize, or at-
tempt to monopolize, . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States
... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .... ." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). See also
section 7 of the Clayton Act: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire...
stock or other share capital ... or assets of another corporation engaged also in com-
merce, where ... the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion, or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
These antitrust statutes would apply only where vertical integration is achieved
through merger, as opposed to internal growth where a company discontinues the use
of independent middlemen and fills these positions with its own employees. But where
merger is involved, Schwinn's tacit encouragement of vertical integration, coupled with
its explicit rejection of vertical territorial restraints imposed after title has passed, con-
flicts directly with the Supreme Court's declaration in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank that "integration by merger is more suspect than integration by contract... 
374 U.S. 321, 366 (1963). See Pollack, supra note 104, at 608-09.
107. See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
108. See Comment, Franchising, supra note 23, at 282-83.
109. See notes 105-106 supra and accompanying text.
In addition to the obvious business disadvantages of a consignment plan, the possi-
bility exists that the cooperation necessary between franchisor and franchisee when
agency practices are employed may be held improper by a further narrowing of Colgate,
Beech-Nut, and Parke, Davis. See Kittelle, Territorial and Customer Restrictions
Through Consignment or Agency--Schwinn or Sin?, 12 ANTrrRUST BULL. 1007, 1025-
27 (1967). See note 23 supra.
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tured product would seem antithetical to a franchise system, since
manufacturers who choose such a system necessarily have a strong
interest in how their products are distributed. 110
Faced with an absolute proscription of all vertical territorial
restraints, large and small manufacturers alike will continue to be
frustrated in their attempts to establish a workable franchise system.
While a financially healthy company may be able to avail itself of those
marketing alternatives which require substantial expenditures," 1 the
burden of Schwinn will fall heavily on the small manufacturer-a party
whose continued competitive vitality the antitrust laws are designed to
preserve."1 The small manufacturer, unable to generate the capital
necessary to vertically integrate the distribution process into his opera-
tion, must either abandon all post-sale controls over his product or risk
a lawsuit by adopting some form of vertical restraint. The Sylvania
case graphically illustrates the dangers of unrestricted distribution. By
applying a "passage of title" test to exclusive location clauses, the Ninth
Circuit may have curtailed Sylvania's ability to attract potential fran-
chisees with promises of limited intrabrand competition,181 and may
have opened the door to product sales by retailers who are deficient
in service expertise" 4 and promotional acumen."15'
CONCLUSION
Schwinn's indiscriminate per se rule is inadequate and unjust in
light of this country's ever-changing patterns of production, distribution,
and consumption. By miscalculating "the economic and business stuff
out of which [vertical territorial restrictions] emerge,""" the Schwinn
Court inhibited the implementation of distribution schemes which pro-
mote competition, and encouraged forms of vertical integration which
seem inconsistent with federal antitrust policy." 7
The Coors courts recognized the need to modify Schwinn's inflex-
110. See notes 113-115 infra and accompanying text.
111. See notes 105 & 109 supra and accompanying text.
112. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1967)
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
114. The need for adequate post-sale service is increased in proportion to product
complexity, and the intricate transistors and circuits of a television set place it high on
the complexity scale. See Bork 446-49.
115. The importance of promotional abilities at the dealer/distributor level was dem-
onstrated in Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (1964). See notes 100-103 supra and
accompanying text.
116. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
117. See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
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ible per se rule, and Sylvania, in addition to demonstrating how easily
the "passage of title" test can be misapplied, illustrated how strict
adherence to Schwinn can unfairly confine a manufacturer to unattrac-
tive distribution methods. Antitrust policy and the exigencies of
today's complex marketplace would be better served by evaluating
vertical territorial restraints under the "rule of reason" standard.
